Non-Combatant Immunity and War-Profiteering by Bazargan, Saba
Noncombatant Immunity and War-Profiteering
Page 1 of 18
PRINTED FROM OXFORD HANDBOOKS ONLINE (www.oxfordhandbooks.com). (c) Oxford University Press, 2015. All Rights
Reserved. Under the terms of the l icence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a title in Oxford
Handbooks Online for personal use (for details see Privacy Policy).
Subscriber: OUP-Reference Gratis Access; date: 19 October 2015
Subject: 	Philosophy,	Social	and	Political	Philosophy
Online	Publication	Date: 	Oct
2015
DOI: 	10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199943418.013.12
Noncombatant	Immunity	and	War-Profiteering	 	
Saba	Bazargan
The	Oxford	Handbook	of	Ethics	and	War	(Forthcoming)
Edited	by	Seth	Lazar	and	Helen	Frowe
Oxford	Handbooks	Online
Abstract	and	Keywords
The	principle	of	noncombatant	immunity	prohibits	warring	parties	from	intentionally	targeting	noncombatants.	I
explicate	the	moral	version	of	this	view	and	its	criticisms	by	reductive	individualists;	they	argue	that	certain
civilians	on	the	unjust	side	are	morally	liable	to	be	lethally	targeted	to	forestall	substantial	contributions	to	that	war.
I	then	argue	that	reductivists	are	mistaken	in	thinking	that	causally	contributing	to	an	unjust	war	is	a	necessary
condition	for	moral	liability.	Certain	noncontributing	civilians—notably,	war-profiteers—can	be	morally	liable	to	be
lethally	targeted.	Thus,	the	principle	of	noncombatant	immunity	is	mistaken	as	a	moral	(though	not	necessarily	as	a
legal)	doctrine,	not	just	because	some	civilians	contribute	substantially,	but	because	some	unjustly	enriched
civilians	culpably	fail	to	discharge	their	restitutionary	duties	to	those	whose	victimization	made	the	unjust
enrichment	possible.	Consequently,	the	moral	criterion	for	lethal	liability	in	war	is	even	broader	than	reductive
individualists	have	argued.
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1.	Background
1.1.	Noncombatant	Immunity	and	the	Combatant’s	Privilege	in	International	Law
In	Article	155	of	what	came	to	be	known	as	the	‘Lieber	Code’,	written	in	1866,	Francis	Lieber	wrote	‘[a]ll	enemies	in
regular	war	are	divided	into	two	general	classes—that	is	to	say,	into	combatants	and	noncombatants’. 	As	a	legal
matter,	this	distinction	does	not	map	perfectly	onto	the	distinction	between	members	and	nonmembers	of	an	armed
force.	For	example,	armed	forces	typically	include	medics	and	religious	personnel,	yet	they	do	not	qualify	as
combatants.	Likewise,	the	distinction	between	combatants	and	noncombatants	does	not	map	perfectly	onto	the
distinction	between	those	who	take	up	arms	in	a	war	and	those	who	do	not.	For	example,	unlawful	combatants	are
sometimes	characterized	as	‘civilians	who	take	up	arms	without	being	authorized	to	do	so	by	international	law’.
On	this	view,	‘just	as	guerrillas	and	militias	are	a	subset	of	“combatant”,	unlawful	combatants	are	a	subset	of
“civilian”’.
In	international	law,	bearing	the	status	of	‘lawful	combatant’	(from	here	on,	I	refer	to	them	simply	as	‘combatants’)
comes	with	considerable	privileges.	According	to	Article	43.2	of	Additional	Protocol	I	to	the	Geneva	Convention,
combatants	‘have	the	right	to	participate	directly	in	hostilities’.	This	means	that	it	is	legally	permissible	for	them	to
engage	in	hostilities,	and	it	is	legally	permissible	to	target	them,	provided	that	they	have	not	surrendered,	been
captured,	been	injured,	or	shipwrecked. 	This	has	come	to	be	known	as	the	‘combatant’s	privilege’.	International
and	common	law	prohibits	warring	parties	from	intentionally	targeting	noncombatants. 	Civilians	will	almost	always
qualify	as	noncombatants.	(Exceptions	include	cases	in	which	a	military	leader	is	also	the	head	of	state.)	But	what
is	a	civilian?	Article	50.1	of	Additional	Protocol	I	defines	civilians	negatively.	It	states	that	any	person	who	is	not	a
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member	of	(1)	the	armed	forces	of	a	party	to	the	conflict;	(2)	other	volunteer	corps,	including	organized	resistance
movements;	(3)	regular	armed	forces	who	profess	allegiance	to	a	government	not	recognized	by	the	detaining
power;	or	(4)	a	levée	en	mass,	is	a	civilian.	Under	Additional	Protocol	I,	‘making	the	civilian	population	or	individual
civilians	the	object	of	attack’	constitutes	a	grave	breach—a	war	crime	of	such	seriousness	as	to	entitle	any	state	to
exercise	jurisdiction	over	any	perpetrator. 	This	legal	doctrine	forbidding	the	targeting	of	civilians	is	the	principle
noncombatant	immunity.	Killing	civilians	collaterally	(i.e.,	as	an	unintended	but	foreseen	side	effect	of	targeting	a
military	(or	dual-use)	installation)	is	acceptable	if	the	civilian	casualties	are	not	disproportionate	to	the	anticipated
military	advantage	that	the	attack	affords.
In	international	law,	the	legal	permission	to	target	combatants	is	based	on	their	status,	rather	than	on	their	conduct,
in	that	it	is	not	whether	she	poses	a	threat	that	makes	a	combatant	a	permissible	target	but	rather	the	very	fact	that
she	qualifies	as	a	combatant	(although	if	a	civilian	participates	directly	in	hostilities	she	eo	ipso	qualifies	as	a
combatant).	Many	combatants—such	as	cooks,	administrative	personnel,	grave-registration	teams,	musicians,
lawyers,	and	the	like—contribute	to	the	war	effort	in	ways	that	do	not	pose	threats	to	anyone.	Yet	since	they	qualify
as	combatants,	they	‘may	be	attacked	at	any	time	until	they	surrender	or	are	otherwise	hors	de	combat,	and	not
only	when	actually	threatening	the	enemy’. 	This	means	that	a	combatant	remains	a	combatant	even	when	she	is
not	actually	fighting.	A	soldier	bivouacked	and	sleeping	retains	her	status	as	a	combatant,	which	means	she	is	a
legitimate	target.
As	with	the	combatant’s	privilege,	the	basis	of	the	principle	of	the	noncombatant	immunity	lies	not	in	the	individual’s
conduct.	What	makes	noncombatants	illegitimate	targets	of	attack	is	not	the	fact	that	they	generally	do	not
contribute	substantially	to	the	war	being	fought;	influential	journalists,	lobbyists,	and	politicians	advocating	for	the
war,	as	well	as	scientists	and	engineers	working	on	technologies	likely	to	be	used	in	weapons	substantially
furthering	the	war	effort,	are	(for	example)	not	legally	targetable	in	spite	of	their	contributory	conduct.
1.2.	The	Orthodox	and	the	Revisionist	Views
So	far,	I	have	described,	if	only	roughly,	the	legal	versions	of	the	combatant’s	privilege	and	the	principle	of
noncombatant	immunity.	Many	assume	that	the	morality	of	war	parallels	international	law,	at	least	with	respect	to
laws	articulating	the	legal	permission	to	target	combatants	and	the	legal	prohibition	against	targeting	not
noncombatants.	I	call	this	assumption	the	‘orthodox	view’.
Among	those	who	defend	the	orthodox	view,	the	most	influential	is	Michael	Walzer.	In	his	book	Just	and	Unjust
Wars,	he	argued	that	civilians	cannot	be	permissibly	targeted	since	they	are	materially	innocent—which	is	to	say
that	they	are	harmless.	The	presumption	is	that	it	is	morally	wrong	to	target	materially	innocent	people	but
permissible	to	target	those	who	are	not	materially	innocent.	Walzer	argues	that	no	active-duty	combatants	during
wartime	are	materially	non-innocent,	since	they	are	all	‘currently	engaged	in	the	business	of	war’. 	Even	those
whose	actual	contribution	to	the	war	is	small	or	nonexistent	are	not	materially	innocent;	by	virtue	of	their	status	as
combatants,	they	have	made	themselves	dangerous.	Accordingly,	all	combatants	are	morally	permissible	targets
of	attack	by	other	combatants.	Although	civilian	journalists,	lobbyists,	politicians,	scientists,	and	engineers	might
individually	contribute	substantially	to	a	war,	they	are	not	themselves	dangerous	men	or	women;	moreover,	their
contributions	to	the	war	do	not	fall	under	the	aegis	of	a	state’s	(or	substate	actor’s)	attempt	to	project	violent	force.
This	argument	in	favour	of	the	orthodox	view	has	been	subjected	to	withering	criticism.	Jeff	McMahan	is	the	most
prolific	of	these	critics.	He	has	argued	that	material	non-innocence	is	neither	a	necessary	nor	a	sufficient	condition
for	losing	one’s	right	not	to	be	killed.	Those	who	pose	morally	justified	threats	do	not	thereby	lose	their	right	not	to
be	killed,	no	more	than	the	victim	of	a	culpable	aggressor	attempting	murder	loses	her	right	not	to	be	attacked
once	she	engages	in	necessary	and	proportionate	self-defence	against	the	culpable	aggressor.	Correspondingly,
combatants	fighting	in	accordance	with	the	rules	of	war	in	furtherance	of	morally	just	aims	cannot	be	permissibly
targeted,	as	a	matter	of	morality.	Although	such	combatants	are	not	materially	innocent,	they	are	nonetheless
morally	innocent:	they	have	done	nothing	to	lose	their	right	not	to	be	killed.	And	it	is	an	individual’s	moral
innocence,	rather	than	her	material	innocence	that	(partly)	determines	whether	she	is	liable	to	be	killed.
Combatants	acting	in	furtherance	of	a	war’s	unjust	aims	are,	on	the	other	hand,	morally	liable	to	be	killed:	they
have	forfeited	their	right	not	to	be	killed,	so	killing	does	not	wrong	them,	provided	that	doing	so	is	necessary	to
achieve	a	good	of	sufficient	importance.	Combatants	participating	in	furtherance	of	an	unjust	aim	are	morally	liable
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to	be	killed	because	such	a	combatant	(provided	she	is	a	full-fledged	agent—e.g.,	she	is	not	a	child	soldier)	is
responsible	for	her	contribution	to	an	end	which	(by	hypothesis)	violates	the	rights	of	others.	Even	if	such	a
combatant	limits	her	targets	to	military	installations	and	personnel,	she	acts	impermissibly	because	those	who	are
only	defending	against	an	unjust	aim	retain	their	right	not	to	be	harmed.	So	the	orthodox	view	is	mistaken	in	its
claim	that	all	combatants	are	morally	entitled	to	kill	enemy	combatants.	On	McMahan’s	‘revisionist	view’,	only
combatants	fighting	against	an	unjust	cause	(or	against	a	just	cause	pursed	by	unjust	means)	are	entitled	to	target
enemy	combatants.
There	have	been	attempts,	aside	from	Walzer’s,	to	defend	some	version	of	the	orthodox	view. 	For	instance,
Thomas	Hurka	has	argued	that	enlistees	waive	the	right	not	to	be	killed.	He	writes:	‘by	voluntarily	entering	military
service,	soldiers	on	both	sides	freely	took	on	the	status	of	soldiers	and	thereby	freely	accepted	that	they	may
permissibly	be	killed	in	the	course	of	war’. 	This	is	because,	he	claims,	‘the	common	conception	of	military	status’
includes	the	combatant’s	privilege—that	is,	an	entitlement	to	target	enemy	combatants.	One	problem	with	this	view,
however,	is	that	although	it	might	accurately	describe	the	intentions	and	expectations	of	some	who	voluntarily	join
the	military,	there	is	little	reason	to	believe	that	this	is	true	of	all	enlistees. 	In	any	case,	even	if	all	combatants	by
virtue	of	enlisting	waive	their	rights	not	to	be	killed,	this	would	only	mean	that	they	do	not	wrong	one	another	by
attempting	to	kill	one	another.	But	they	still	contribute	to	the	achievement	of	that	unjust	aim,	which	makes	what	they
do	morally	impermissible,	again	suggesting	that	the	combatant’s	privilege	is	mistaken	at	the	level	of	morality.
On	the	revisionist	view,	the	moral	basis	of	the	prohibition	against	targeting	noncombatants—that	is,	the	principle	of
noncombatant	immunity—is	that	everyone	has	by	default	a	right	not	to	be	killed	and	an	even	more	stringent	right
not	to	be	killed	intentionally.	According	to	the	revisionist	view,	noncombatants	typically	do	nothing	to	forfeit	that
right.	Whether	an	individual	has	done	something	to	forfeit	such	a	right	depends	on	her	degree	of	responsibility	for
the	wrong	which	harming	her	helps	avert.	As	Robert	Holmes	suggests,	the	degree	of	responsibility	an	individual
bears	for	a	war	varies	with	the	degree	and	kind	of	contribution	that	individual	makes	to	the	war,	with	‘initiators	of
wrongdoing	(government	leaders)’	and	‘agents	of	wrongdoing	(military	commanders	and	combat	soldiers)’	bearing
the	most	responsibility	and	the	paradigmatically	innocent	bearing	the	least. 	Because	the	typical	civilian	bears
very	little	to	no	responsibility	for	the	wrongs	committed	by	her	government,	she	is	not	morally	liable	to	be	targeted
in	order	to	avert	those	wrongs.
But	the	claim	that	civilians	are	not	liable	to	be	killed	(whereas	noncombatants	are)	is	a	statistical	claim	in	that	only
typically	will	noncombatants	be	less	responsible	than	combatants.	Although	the	aforementioned	influential
journalist,	lobbyist,	politician,	scientist,	or	engineer,	are	civilians,	they	make	(by	hypothesis)	substantial
contributions	to	the	unjust	war	their	government	is	fighting;	on	the	revisionist	view,	they	would	be	morally	liable	to
be	targeted	if	doing	so	is	necessary	to	save	any	number	of	innocent	lives.	So	noncombatants	do	not	enjoy	blanket
immunity	from	intentional	attack	on	the	revisionist	view.	Rather,	only	those	who	are	not	responsible	for	substantial
contributions	to	the	war	are	immune	(in	the	sense	that	they	are	not	morally	liable	to	be	killed).
This	does	not	mean	that	influential	pro-war	lobbyists,	politicians	and	the	like	can	be	targeted	at	whim	in	war—
rather,	on	the	revisionist	view,	they	can	be	targeted	only	if	doing	so	is	the	least	harmful	way	of	saving	(any	number
of)	innocent	lives.	So	targeting	influential	pro-war	pundits	on	the	opposing	side	is	likely	to	be	unjust,	if	only	because
their	violent	deaths	are	more	likely	to	aid	their	cause	than	avert	further	harm.	But	those	scientists	and	engineers
contributing	to	an	unjust	war	(and	who	are	in	a	position	to	recognize	that	what	they	are	doing	is	wrong)	would
indeed	be	morally	liable	to	be	killed	if	their	contributions	wrongfully	endanger	innocents	and	if	killing	the
contributors	is	necessary	to	avert	that	threat. 	McMahan	has	defended	this	sort	of	view. 	Cecile	Fabre	similarly
suggests	that	that	although	contributing	civilians	are	morally	immune	from	intentional	attack,	this	is	only	for	highly
contingent	reasons—namely,	that	most	wars	include	both	just	and	unjust	aims	and	that	civilians	typically	cannot
know	which	aims	their	contributions	are	promoting.
1.3.	Challenges	to	the	Revisionist	View
The	revisionist	view	faces	a	number	of	challenges.	According	to	the	revisionist,	culpability	is	not	a	necessary
condition	for	liability	to	a	lethal	harm.	This	view	might	strike	some	as	draconian;	if	an	individual	contributes	to	a
wrongful	threat	nonculpably,	then	she	cannot	be	liable	to	lethal	harms.	If	this	criticism	is	correct,	then	many
combatants	fighting	in	furtherance	of	an	unjust	cause	will	qualify	as	morally	innocent.	This	is	because	the
indoctrination,	manipulation,	and	coercion	of	these	young	and	consequently	cognitively	underdeveloped
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combatants	by	their	culture,	state,	and	military	might	serve	as	partially	excusing	conditions	combining	to
substantially	diminish	their	culpability	for	what	they	do. 	Some	have	pointed	out	that	a	significant	portion	of
combatants—such	as	those	who	occupy	highly	subsidiary	support	roles,	as	well	those	involved	in	actual	combat
but	who	are	ineffective	as	fighters—might	contribute	no	more	to	the	war	effort	than	the	typical	civilian	does. 	If
those	combatants	are	nonetheless	liable	to	be	attacked,	then	the	threshold	of	contributory	responsibility	is	so	low
that	the	typical	civilian	will	be	liable	as	well.	If	we	raise	the	threshold	of	contributory	responsibility	so	that	the	typical
civilian	is	nonliable,	then	the	highly	subsidiary	and	the	ineffective	combatants	will	be	nonliable	as	well.	The	former
option	has	the	absurd	consequence	of	rendering	the	typical	civilian	liable	to	be	targeted.	The	latter	option	invites	a
version	of	pacifism,	insofar	as	it	is	pragmatically	impossible	to	conduct	a	war	requiring	us	to	discriminate	between
liable	and	nonliable	combatants,	if	their	liability	is	grounded	in	their	individual	conduct. 	This	problem	has	been
dubbed	the	‘responsibility	dilemma’.
In	an	attempt	to	diffuse	the	dilemma,	McMahan	argues	that	the	constraint	against	killing	intentionally	is	not	violated
when	we	reasonably	although	mistakenly	believe	that	the	target	is	liable	to	be	killed. 	If	this	is	correct,	the	weight
assigned	to	the	deaths	of	nonliable	combatants	is	discounted	substantially,	thereby	averting	the	pacifism	horn	of
the	responsibility	dilemma.	To	diffuse	the	‘total	war’	horn	of	the	dilemma,	McMahan	argues	that	when	civilians
causally	contribute	to	unjust	wars	fought	by	their	governments,	they	typically	do	so	through	tax	payments	serving
a	plurality	of	worthy	aims	that	justify	these	payments,	thereby	precluding	liability	to	defensive	action. 	Bradley
Strawser,	in	defence	of	the	revisionist	view,	suggests	an	emendation:	abandoning	the	binary	‘combatant	or
noncombatant’	distinction,	in	favour	of	a	conflict-sensitive	rubric	that	tracks	differing	levels	of	liability	based	on
what	he	calls	their	‘reasonable	perceived	liability’.	He	writes	that	‘[t]he	distinctions	could	range	from	1st,	2nd	and
3rd-degree	combatants	and	the	like	(or	more,	as	needed)	and	similar	degrees	for	non-combatants’. 	I	have
argued	that	supplementing	the	revisionist	view	with	an	account	of	complicitous	liability	provides	a	basis	for	thinking
that	nearly	all	combatants—including	ineffective	and	highly	subsidiary	ones—bear	complicitous	liability.
Others	have	maintained	that	we	cannot	justify	intentional	killing	in	war	by	appealing	to	the	liability	of	combatants.
For	example,	Janina	Dill	and	Henry	Shue	argue	that	even	if	combatants	are	liable	to	some	harms	due	to	their
individual	contributions	to	an	unjust	cause,	most	of	them	do	not	contribute	enough	to	make	lethal	attack	necessary
and	proportionate. 	Since	a	liability-based	justification	is	unavailable,	a	war	is	morally	justified	only	if	it	is	the
lesser	evil	relative	to	refraining	from	waging	the	war.	And	since	the	enemy	combatants	are	not	liable	to	be	killed,
the	calculation	determining	whether	the	war	is	a	lesser	evil	must	weigh	the	deaths	of	enemy	combatants	as	heavily
or	nearly	as	heavily	as	the	deaths	of	enemy	civilians. 	Dill	denies,	however,	that	this	restrictive	view	of	war
should	be	enshrined	in	international	law	since,	on	her	view,	it	is	not	to	the	role	of	international	law	to	vouchsafe	the
moral	acceptability	of	war. 	Nonetheless,	if	wars	are	only	morally	justified	as	the	lesser	evil,	then	a	version	of
contingent	pacifism	is	likely	correct:	given	how	wars	are	actually	fought,	it	is	practically	impossible	for	any	wars	to
be	just.	Larry	May	is	the	most	prominent	supporter	of	this	view.
Although	I	think	the	revisionist	view	is	largely	correct,	it	is	critically	incomplete.	Implicit	in	this	picture	of	the	morality
of	war	is	the	presumption	that	causation	is	a	necessary	basis	for	liability	to	lethal	harms.	Accordingly,	the
discussion	of	liability	in	war	has	focused	on	what	sort	of	causal	contributions	serve	as	a	basis	for	liability	to	be
killed	and	how	great	that	contribution	must	be	to	entail	such	liability.	In	these	discussions,	the	possibility	that
civilians	can	be	liable	to	be	killed	without	having	causally	contributed	to	the	war	fought	by	their	government	has
been	met	with	scepticism,	partly	because	it	has	been	assumed	that	such	arguments	would	have	to	rely	on
accounts	of	vicarious	or	collective	responsibility.	Some	have	defended	this	sort	of	expansive	view	of	responsibility.
In	particular,	Virginia	Held 	and	Igor	Primoratz 	have	argued	that	civilians	in	a	democracy	who	support	their
government’s	unjust	war	can,	at	least	in	principle,	be	liable	to	be	attacked,	even	if	their	causal	contributions	to	the
war	are	minimal	or	nil.
But	I	will	argue	for	a	noncausal	basis	of	liability	to	lethal	harms,	one	that	does	not	rely	on	any	notions	of	vicarious
or	collective	responsibility.	Specifically,	I	will	argue	that	certain	kinds	of	war-profiteers—those	who	buy	or	sell	in
substantial	quantities	resources	wrongfully	misappropriated	from	a	civilian	population	through	armed	force—will
sometimes	be	morally	liable	to	be	killed	even	if	they	have	done	nothing	to	contribute	to	that	war.	Such	a	war-
profiteer	can	be	liable	on	the	grounds	that	she	has	failed	in	her	duty	of	restitution	toward	the	relevant	civilians
insofar	as	she	is	under	a	duty	to	return	to	the	civilians	the	wrongfully	misappropriated	resources	(or	its	equivalent
value).	A	failure	to	discharge	a	duty	of	restitution	does	not	usually	render	an	unjust	beneficiary	liable	to	lethal
corrective	force	because	(1)	there	are	usually	alternative	corrective	mechanisms	available,	(2)	harming	her	will
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not	prevent	the	wrong	that	made	the	unjust	beneficiary’s	enrichment	possible,	and	(3)	her	failure	does	not	result	in
or	contribute	to	lethal	harms.	But	I	will	argue	that	when	these	conditions	do	not	obtain,	a	culpable	failure	to
discharge	a	restitutionary	duty	can	indeed	render	a	person	liable	to	lethal	harm.	And	these	conditions	often	fail	to
obtain	in	war.
So,	in	one	sense,	the	revisionist	view	is	not	revisionist	enough:	we	ought	to	abandon	the	notion	that	causally
contributing	to	war	is	a	necessary	condition	for	moral	liability	to	lethal	harm.	Victor	Tadros	has	argued	in	favour	of
a	position	like	this.	On	his	view,	noncombatants	are	made	liable	if	they	benefit	from	the	unjust	activity	of
combatants—activity	for	which	the	noncombatants	are	intended	beneficiaries. 	Restricting	our	defensive	violence
solely	to	unjust	combatants	increases	the	chances	that	such	combatants	will	be	harmed,	in	comparison	to	a	case
in	which	we	achieve	our	defensive	goal	by	dispersing	the	defensive	violence	so	that	it	is	not	concentrated	solely
on	combatants.	In	deciding	how	to	disperse	a	fixed	amount	of	necessary	defensive	violence,	it	is	unfair	to	‘rule	out’
the	intended	beneficiaries	of	those	whose	unjust	acts	necessitated	the	resort	to	violence.	In	such	a	case,	‘Fairness
determines	the	distribution	of	liability,	and	fairness	militates	against	a	strict	causation	requirement	on	liability’.
Still,	Tadros	explicitly	denies	that	noncombatants	are	liable	to	be	killed—only	that	they	are	liable	to	sublethal	harms.
I	argue,	on	the	other	hand,	that	certain	noncontributing	civilians	are	indeed	morally	liable	to	be	lethally	targeted	in
war.	Thus,	the	principle	of	noncombatant	immunity	is	mistaken	at	the	level	of	morality,	not	just	because	some
civilians	contribute	substantially,	and	not	just	because	civilians	are	in	the	intended	beneficiaries	of	their	military’s
unjust	acts,	but	also	because	some	unjustly	enriched	civilians	culpably	fail	to	discharge	their	restitutionary	duties
to	those	whose	victimization	made	the	unjust	enrichment	possible—or	so	I	will	argue.
2.	On	War-Profiteering	in	General
The	term	‘war-profiteer’	is	a	vague	pejorative.	The	American	government	tends	to	regard	war-profiteers	as
subcontractors	who	defraud	the	government	in	the	course	of	providing	goods	or	services	supporting	a	war.	But	my
use	of	the	term	is	broader	than	this;	it	is	inspired	by	Brigadier	General	Smedly	D.	Butler’s	famed	tract	‘War	Is	a
Racket’. 	On	my	usage,	a	war-profiteer	is	someone	who	derives	substantial	monetary	benefits	from	an	unjust	war
by	either	(1)	selling	goods	and	services	supporting	the	war	(this	includes	defence	contractors,	private	security
contractors,	and	risk-management	companies),	(2)	trading	in	resources	misappropriated	in	the	course	of	that	war,
or	(3)	selling	services	or	goods	aimed	at	postwar	reconstruction.	I	will	call	(1)	‘support-related’	war-profiteers,	(2)
‘resource-related’	war-profiteers,	and	(3)	‘reconstruction-related’	war-profiteers.	These	are	not	clean	divisions;
some	services	fall	under	more	than	one	category.	For	example,	London-based	Erinys	and	Nour	USA	was	granted
$80	million	and	$136	million,	respectively,	to	secure	Iraq’s	oil	pipelines	during	the	US-led	war	in	Iraq—a	service	that
can	be	categorized	under	both	support-related	and	resource-related	profiteering.
Note	that	it	is	possible	to	seek	and	gain	substantial	monetary	benefits	from	an	unjust	war	without	doing	so	wrongly
and	thereby	without	qualifying	as	a	war-profiteer.	For	example,	the	unpopularity	of	the	Vietnam	War	led	many
potential	conscripts	to	enrol	in	universities	in	an	effort	to	avoid	the	draft;	even	if	this	served	as	a	financial	boon	to
certain	private	universities,	those	who	benefited	did	not	qualify	as	war-profiteers	because	they	did	not	derive	these
benefits	wrongly.	Of	course,	this	requires	an	account	of	what	qualifies	as	a	wrongful	benefit.	(I	provide	part	of	such
an	account	in	subsequent	sections.)
I	have	distinguished	war-profiteers	along	one	dimension:	the	sort	of	goods	or	services	they	provide	(support-
based,	resource-based,	or	reconstruction-based).	I	will	also	distinguish	war-profiteers	along	another	dimension:
whether	they	contribute	to	the	war.	One	can	contribute	to	a	war	by	aiding	materially	in	the	war	effort	(e.g.,	by
manufacturing	armaments)	or	providing	an	incentive	to	wage	the	war	(e.g.,	by	lobbying	the	government	in	favour
of	the	war).	Consequently,	all	three	types	of	war-profiteers	can	be	contributory,	even	if	they	provide	goods	or
services	only	after	hostilities	have	ended	(as	is	often	the	case	with	resource-based	and	reconstruction-based	war-
profiteers),	provided	that,	prior	to	the	war,	they	incentivize	the	decision	to	wage	the	war.
But	not	all	war-profiteers	contribute	to	the	war.	Although	support-based	war-profiteers	will	almost	always	be
contributory,	resource-based	and	reconstruction-based	war-profiteers	might	not	be	if	they	were	simply	unwilling	or
unable	to	effectively	lobby	the	government	in	favour	of	the	war.	This	is	most	obvious	in	cases	where	the
corporation	did	not	exist	at	the	outset	of	the	war	(as	was	the	case	with	Nour	USA,	which	was	formed	only	after	the
US-led	war	in	Iraq	was	under	way).	I	will	call	war-profiteers	who	derive	substantial	benefits	from	a	war	without
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actually	contributing	to	the	war	‘opportunistic’	(rather	than	‘contributory’)	war-profiteers.
If	the	revisionist	view	is	correct,	and	hence	the	principle	of	noncombatant	immunity	is	mistaken,	contributory	war-
profiteers	can	be	morally	liable	to	be	killed	when	doing	so	is	necessary	to	save	the	lives	of	any	number	of
innocents.	In	what	follows,	though,	I	will	motivate	the	even	more	controversial	view	that	certain	opportunistic	war-
profiteers—specifically,	resource-based	war-profiteers—can	be	liable	to	be	killed,	even	though,	by	definition,	they
are	not	contributing	to	an	unjust	war	(or	at	least	not	contributing	to	a	degree	any	greater	than	the	average	civilian
does).
3.	Examples	of	Resource-Based	War-Profiteers
Resource-based	war-profiteers	derive	monetary	benefits	from	an	unjust	war	by	gaining	access	to	resources
misappropriated	in	the	course	of	that	war.	There	are	several	ways	to	categorize	resource-based	war-profiteers.
We	can	distinguish	resource-based	war-profiteers	who	benefit	by	wrongly	selling	resources	from	those	who
benefit	by	wrongly	buying	resources.
Recall	that	a	resource-based	war-profiteer	is	someone	who	trades	in	resources	misappropriated	in	the	course	of
an	unjust	war.	A	resource-based	war-profiteering	exporter	sells	misappropriated	resources,	thereby	earning	a
profit.	The	resources	are	misappropriated	in	the	sense	that	some	or	all	of	their	value	belongs	to	civilians	who	were
wrongly	dispossessed	of	the	resources	or	the	land	from	which	it	was	extracted.	Suppose,	for	example,	an	unjustly
aggressing	country	gains	a	foothold	in	the	country	it	is	aggressing	against;	the	former	now	has	effective	control
over	resource-rich	land	properly	belonging	to	the	latter.	The	aggressing	country	then	grants	a	corporation	access
to	that	resource-rich	land	for	development.	If	a	fair	portion	of	the	profits	derived	from	the	corporation’s	activities
are	not	transferred	to	the	people	of	the	country	to	whom	the	land	and	resources	properly	belong,	then	they	are
deprived	of	that	to	which	they	a	have	a	proper	claim.	The	corporation	thereby	misappropriates	the	country’s
resources	and	sells	them	at	a	profit,	which	qualifies	the	corporation	as	a	resource-based	war-profiteering	exporter.
Of	course,	what	counts	as	a	‘fair	share’	is	debatable.	I	will	pass	the	buck	by	simply	stating	that	failing	to	pay	a	fair
share—whatever	it	is—constitutes	a	misappropriation	of	the	relevant	resources.	I	am	assuming,	though,	that	the
relevant	territory	and	the	resources	in	it	rightfully	belong	to	at	least	some	of	the	people	of	the	country	in	which	the
territory	is	located;	consequently,	even	the	most	ardent	libertarian	would	admit	that	the	‘fair	share’	is	something
greater	than	zero.
But	suppose	that	the	people	to	whom	the	resource-rich	territory	properly	belongs	lacked	the	means	or	inclination	to
develop	it	in	the	way	necessary	to	extract	its	resources.	It	might	seem,	then,	that	they	are	deprived	of	nothing	if
the	territory	is	developed	without	their	consent.	Or,	more	precisely,	it	might	seem	that	what	they	are	deprived	of	is
limited	to	whatever	value	the	use	of	the	territory	had	for	the	people	using	it.	Suppose	they	were	using	it	as	a	park;
the	corporation,	without	the	people’s	consent,	destroys	the	park	by	converting	it	into	a	mine,	thereby	depriving	the
people	of	the	park.	The	corporation	consequently	owes	the	people	a	park	or	its	equivalent	value	in	compensation.
What	it	does	not	owe,	one	might	argue,	is	a	percentage	of	the	value	of	the	resources	extracted	from	the	mine;	this
is	because	those	resources	were	effectively	out	of	the	people’s	reach	in	any	case.	I	will	respond	to	this	argument
in	the	next	section.	Until	then,	I	will	assume	that	those	who	own	the	territory	in	which	natural	resources	are	located
thereby	also	own	the	natural	resources;	consequently,	they	must	be	compensated	for	the	extraction	or	use	of
those	resources.
Historical	examples	of	resource-based	war-profiteering	exporters	abound.	For	instance,	the	CIA	in	1964	led	an
invasion	of	Guatemala,	subsequently	deposing	its	democratically	elected	leader	by	recruiting,	training,	and	arming
480	mercenary	soldiers	commanded	by	an	exiled	right-wing	Guatemalan	Army	officer.	The	resulting	military	junta
annulled	former	President	Jacobo	Arbenz	Guzmán’s	agrarian	reform	legislation	and	new	Labour	Code,	which	had
threatened	American	corporate	interests—specifically	that	of	the	United	Fruit	Company.	Following	the	coup,	the
United	Fruit	Company	could	cultivate	and	export	its	products	without	properly	compensating	its	workers	or	the
country’s	people.	It	thereby	qualified	as	resource-based	war-profiteering	exporter.
A	resource-based	war-profiteering	importer	purchases	rather	than	sells	misappropriated	resources	in	a	war.
Suppose	an	armed	group	(such	as	a	substate	insurgency)	unjustly	gains	effective	control	over	territory	with
natural	resources.	It	then	develops	those	resources	and	sells	them	on	the	international	market	in	order	to	finance
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arms	purchases.	In	doing	so,	the	group	is	able	to	sell	the	resources	at	below-market	cost	by	failing	to	properly
compensate	the	workers	extracting	the	resources	or	the	people	living	on	the	acquired	territory	to	whom	the
resources	properly	belong.	Now	suppose	that	a	foreign	state	or	corporation	agrees	to	purchase	the	resources	at
below-market	cost	even	though	it	is	common	knowledge	that	the	reason	why	the	resources	are	available	at	such
low	cost	is	that	they	were	procured	without	adequate	compensation.	The	buyer	consequently	qualifies	as	a
resource-based	war-profiteering	importer	insofar	as	it	is	knowingly	purchased	wrongfully	acquired	goods	and
benefitted	from	doing	so.
For	example,	the	Forces	Démocratiques	de	Libération	du	Rwanda	(FDLR)—a	Rwandan	Hutu	rebel	group	in	the	east
of	the	Democratic	Republic	of	the	Congo	opposed	to	Tutsi	influence	in	the	region—has	been	engaged	in	armed
conflicts	since	its	formation	in	2000.	The	group,	through	its	control	of	mining	fields	such	as	those	in	the	North	Kivu
province,	has	been	able	to	smuggle	out	and	sell	minerals	(such	as	coltan	and	cassiterite)	to	international	buyers.	In
2008,	a	United	Nations	expert	panel	argued	that	‘targeting	companies	complicit	in	systematically	trading	materials
with	FDLR	and	promoting	due	diligence	within	the	international	minerals	supply	chain	represent	effective	ways	of
cutting	off	the	financial	support	of	FDLR’.	These	international	buyers	qualify	as	resource-based	war-profiteering
importers.
Sometimes	the	government	of	a	country	colludes	with	foreign	states	or	corporations	in	the	misappropriation	of	the
country’s	resources	during	an	internal	armed	conflict	in	order	to	procure	funds	in	furtherance	of	defeating	the
insurgency.	If	the	government	is	illegitimate,	and	if	it	defrauds	its	people	by	entering	into	a	deal	that	denies	them
their	fair	share	of	the	resource’s	value,	and	if	the	foreign	state	or	corporation	agrees	to	the	deal	without
subsequently	transferring	a	fair	share	of	the	resource’s	value	to	the	people,	then	it	qualifies	as	a	resource-based
war-profiteer.	The	group	in	question	has,	after	all,	obtained	access	to	goods	without	the	consent	of	the	persons	to
whom	the	goods	belong	and	without	compensating	them	for	the	conversion	of	the	goods’	value.	For	example,	in
2000,	during	the	Second	Liberian	Civil	War,	Charles	Taylor’s	regime	officially	collected	only	$6.6	million	in	taxes
from	the	$186	million	in	sales	of	timber.	China	and	French	logging	interests	were	the	main	importers	(46	per	cent
and	18	per	cent,	respectively).	Much	of	the	untaxed	funds	were	used	to	finance	Charles	Taylor’s	side	of	the	war
against	rebel	groups.	The	Chinese	and	French	logging	interests	qualify	as	resource-based	war-profiteering
importers.
We	might	be	inclined	to	think	that	unscrupulous	private	parties	who	want	to	benefit	from	an	unjust	war	will	always
lobby	in	favour	of	the	war,	thereby	contributing	positively	to	the	decision	to	wage	that	war.	But	this	overstates	both
the	influence	and	instrumental	rationality	of	war-profiteers.	Sometimes	they	are	simply	not	in	a	position	to	lobby	the
government.	At	other	times,	attempts	to	influence	decision-making	in	favour	of	the	war	are	ineffective.	And,	in	still
other	cases,	they	simply	fail	to	recognize	that	the	candidate	war	will	in	fact	benefit	them.	Suppose	an	unjustly
aggressing	warlord	gains	control	of	a	lawful	government’s	alluvial	diamond	mines,	which	he	intends	to	mine	using
forced	labour.	But	flight	from	local	violence	has	deprived	him	of	enough	manpower	to	run	the	mines.	The	warlord
failed	to	foresee	this	eventuality.	Unexpectedly,	though,	a	third-party	conglomerate	(hitherto	unknown	by	the
warlord)	expresses	interest	in	leasing	access	to	the	mine.	The	warlord	consents.	In	this	case,	the	third	party
derives	financial	benefit	from	the	wrong	of	wresting	control	of	the	diamond	mine	from	the	proper	authorities,	without
(ex	hypothesi)	causing	or	contributing	to	that	wrong.	After	all,	by	the	time	the	third	party	leases	the	mine,	it	is
already	handily	in	the	warlord’s	control.	In	this	case,	the	third-party	conglomerate	qualifies	as	a	purely
opportunistic	rather	than	a	contributory	resource-based	war-profiteering	exporter.
In	what	follows,	I	argue	that	opportunistic	resource-based	war-profiteers	(whether	importers	or	exporters)	can	bear
substantial	liability	even	though	they	do	not	contribute	to	the	unjust	war	from	which	they	benefit.
4.	Duties	of	Redress
Wrongful	appropriation	of	goods	can	generate	duties	of	redress.	If	someone	wrongfully	commits	theft	and
subsequently	transfers	the	property	(or	converts	it	to	an	equivalent	value	which	is	transferred)	to	a	third	party	who
knows	the	property	was	stolen,	the	third	party	thereby	acquires	a	(defeasible)	duty	to	return	to	the	victim	the
property	(or	its	equivalent	value	if	it	has	been	irretrievably	converted,	damaged,	or	lost).	The	third	party	has	such
a	duty	even	if	she	did	not	contribute	to	or	cause	the	theft	in	the	first	place.	In	this	case,	the	wrong	for	which	the
third	party	is	responsible	is	not	the	theft;	as	I	stipulated,	she	did	not	cause	or	contribute	to	that	wrong.	Rather,	the
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wrong	for	which	the	third	party	is	responsible	is	the	wrong	of	failing	to	return	to	the	victim	the	goods	(or	its	value)
that	she	currently	has	in	her	possession.
Now	consider	a	case	not	of	theft,	but	of	unjust	enrichment.	Suppose	that	Thief	steals	Victim’s	car,	just	to	see	if	she
could	get	away	with	it.	Now	in	possession	of	an	unwanted	car,	Thief,	on	a	whim,	gives	it	to	Beneficiary	as	a	gift.
Beneficiary	knows	that	the	car	was	stolen;	she	in	no	way	encouraged	or	otherwise	contributed	to	the	theft.
Beneficiary	then	rents	the	car	to	others	(who	are	nonculpably	ignorant	that	the	car	was	stolen)	as	part	of	a	car-
rental	business,	thereby	deriving	profit	from	its	use.	In	such	a	case,	Beneficiary	is	unjustly	enriched	by	her
wrongful	use	of	the	car.	She	has	a	duty	to	return	not	only	the	car	but	the	profits	that	she	derived	from	its	wrongful
use.
There	are	several	reasons	for	thinking	that	the	unjustly	enriched	beneficiary	is	morally	required	to	disgorge	the
wrongfully	obtained	benefits,	provided	that	she	knew	how	it	was	obtained.	The	relevant	cardinal	principle	in	tort
and	criminal	law	in	general,	and	in	the	law	of	restitution	specifically,	is	that	the	defendant	should	not	benefit	from
her	wrongdoing. 	There	are,	of	course,	pragmatic	reasons	for	this:	we	have	an	interest	in	ensuring	that	the
expected	utility	for	wrongdoing	remains	negative.	But	there	are,	in	addition,	moral	reasons	of	interpersonal	fairness
for	requiring	the	unjust	beneficiary	to	transfer	the	enriched	benefits:	deriving	gains	from	flouting	moral	norms
makes	those	who	abide	by	them	comparatively	worse	off,	which	is	unfair.	Suppose	that	I	commit	a	murder,	and	I
benefit	from	it	by	subsequently	publishing	a	book	about	my	heinous	deeds.	This	makes	nonmurderers
comparatively	worse	off,	which	is	unfair.
But	one	might	point	out	that	this	shows,	at	best,	that	Beneficiary	should	disgorge	the	profits	she	made	by	wrongly
using	Victim’s	car—and	not	that	it	should	be	transferred	to	Victim	specifically.	After	all,	Beneficiary	has	not
deprived	Victim	of	anything	other	than	the	car	(given	that	Victim	was	not	going	to	rent	out	the	car	herself).	It
seems,	then,	that	Beneficiary	owes	Victim	only	the	car,	or	its	value,	and	not	the	profit	derived	from	it.	But,
interestingly,	this	is	not	borne	out	in	tort	law.	According	to	the	so-called	‘user	principle’, 	the	plaintiff	is	owed	the
amount	that	the	defendant	would	have	been	willing	to	pay	for	the	use	of	the	plaintiff’s	property.	So,	for	example,
where	a	trespasser	has	taken	a	shortcut	across	a	plaintiff’s	land,	she	will	be	required	to	pay	damages	assessed	by
reference	to	the	fee	that	she	should	have	had	to	pay	to	obtain	the	plaintiff’s	permission	to	use	the	land.	Indeed,
where	a	defendant	has	wrongfully	interfered	with	the	plaintiff’s	property,	damages	should	go	to	the	plaintiff	even	if	it
is	clear	that	the	plaintiff	would	not	have	bargained	with	the	defendant	for	use	of	the	property. 	In	such	a	case,
instead	of	saying	that	the	unjust	beneficiary	is	liable	to	restore	a	benefit	to	the	victim,	she	is	instead	liable	to
transfer	the	value	of	a	benefit	to	the	victim.	That	is,	the	unjust	beneficiary	has	a	restitutionary	(rather	than
restorative)	duty.
If	the	user	principle	is	correct	as	a	matter	of	morality,	then	this	suggests	that	resource-based	war-profiteers	have	a
restitutionary	duty	to	those	whose	resources	were	misappropriated	by	developing	and	exporting	the	resources
without	properly	compensating	those	to	whom	the	resources	belong	or	by	acquiring	such	resources	through	their
purchase.	This	duty	is	discharged	by	transferring	to	the	victims	a	share	of	the	wrongfully	derived	profits—
specifically,	the	amount	that	they	should	have	paid	ex	ante.
This	restitutionary	duty	can	serve	as	grounds	for	liability.	Specifically,	the	opportunistic	resource-based	war-
profiteer	is	liable	to	certain	harms	necessary	to	force	her	to	transfer	the	unjustly	derived	benefits	to	the	victims	if
she	culpably	fails	to	discharge	that	duty.	But	what	harms	are	these?	In	the	context	of	domestic	tort	law,	the	harms
to	which	such	an	individual	is	liable	are	highly	circumscribed.	She	might	be	liable	to	fines,	but	she	will	not	be	liable
to	physical	harms,	such	as	maiming	and	killing,	even	if	imposing	such	harms	is	necessary	to	force	her	to	disgorge
her	wrongly	derived	benefits.	And	whatever	harms	she	is	indeed	liable	to	suffer	in	the	context	of	civil	society	are
subject	to	the	constraint	of	due	process,	in	that	the	victim	cannot	take	it	upon	herself	to	force	her	wrongdoer	to
discharge	her	restorative	duty.	Rather,	the	victim	must	proceed	by	way	of	the	courts.	But	outside	the	context	of
civil	society,	the	harms	to	which	an	individual	becomes	liable	are	more	substantial	and	are	free	of	due-process
constraints.	Consider	this	example:
Food.	In	a	failed	state	stricken	with	famine,	and	without	a	functioning	criminal	justice	system	or	police	force,	Thief
steals	Victim’s	supply	of	food,	which	rightfully	belongs	to	Victim	(in	virtue	of	having	produced	it).	Without	it,	Victim
will	likely	die.	Thief	mistakenly	drops	the	parcels	of	food	while	driving	away.	A	third	party,	Beneficiary,	witnesses
these	events	unfold	from	afar.	He	takes	the	food,	despite	knowing	that	it	belongs	it	to	Victim.
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Clearly,	Beneficiary	is	obligated	to	return	the	food	to	Victim,	even	if	Beneficiary	needs	the	food	to	survive.	By
culpably	ignoring	this	obligation	he	makes	herself	liable	to	proportionate	harm	necessary	to	force	him	to	return	the
food.	Now	suppose	that	the	only	way	to	force	Beneficiary	to	do	so	is	to	kill	him.	It	seems	to	me	that	killing
Beneficiary	would	not	violate	his	right.	That	is,	Beneficiary	is	liable	to	be	killed	if	necessary	to	force	him	to	return
the	food	to	Victim.	This	is	because	Beneficiary’s	culpable	failure	to	return	the	food	is	particularly	egregious,
considering	that	Victim	not	only	has	a	right	to	the	food,	but	also	needs	it	to	live.
It	is	important	to	recognize	that	although	Beneficiary	had	no	control	(we	can	assume)	over	Thief’s	actions,	he	does
indeed	have	control	over	whether	he	returns	the	food	he	has	wrongfully	procured.	In	this	sense,	Beneficiary	can
avert	his	own	culpable	wrongdoing,	which	is	a	condition	that	any	plausible	moral	principle	must	satisfy.	Now
consider	an	analogous	case	of	unjust	enrichment:
Well.	In	a	failed	state	stricken	with	famine	and	without	a	functioning	criminal	justice	system	or	police	force,	Thief
culpably	invades	Victim’s	farmland	and	takes	over	her	well,	which	properly	belongs	to	Victim.	In	doing	so,	Thief
badly	injures	Victim.	Thief	had	planned	on	using	the	well	himself,	but	finds	he	has	no	use	for	it.	So	he	instead	leases
the	well	to	Beneficiary,	who	knows	how	the	well	was	obtained.	Beneficiary	uses	the	well	to	water	her	crops;	she
consequently	derives	a	substantial	profit.	Victim,	who	is	penniless,	needs	resources	equivalent	to	a	substantial
proportion	of	those	profits	to	survive	the	injuries	she	sustained	in	the	initial	attack.
In	this	case,	it	seems	that	Beneficiary	has	a	restitutionary	duty	to	Victim	in	that	Beneficiary	is	obligated	to	transfer	to
Victim	(in	accordance	with	the	moral	version	of	the	user	principle)	the	earnings	derived	from	the	well’s	use
equivalent	to	the	market	value	of	renting	out	the	well	for	that	period	of	time.	(Any	additional	gains	made	from	the
well’s	illicit	use	would	be	transferred	to	Victim	or	disgorged.)
In	general,	a	restitutionary	duty	can	be	overridden	or	outweighed	when	the	party	owing	the	funds	needs	it	for
something	much	more	important	than	what	the	party	to	whom	the	funds	are	owed	will	use	it	for.	But	in	Well,	not	only
is	Victim’s	life	at	stake,	but	it	is	at	stake	as	a	result	of	the	well’s	appropriation,	which	was	used	as	a	means	to
enrich	Beneficiary.	So	the	user	principle,	in	combination	with	(1)	the	fact	that	Beneficiary	does	not	need	the	profits
much	more	than	Victim	does	and	(2)	the	fact	that	Beneficiary	knows	that	the	well	was	wrongfully	appropriated,
gives	us	reason	to	think	that	Beneficiary	has	a	restitutionary	duty	to	Victim,	even	though	she	did	not	cause	or
contribute	to	Victim’s	harm.
The	upshot	is	that	culpable	unjust	enrichment	can,	in	certain	circumstances,	ground	duties	of	restitution.	What
counts	as	unjust	enrichment,	though,	depends	on	how	the	beneficiary	was	enriched.	Suppose	Thief	uses	the	car
she	stole	from	Victim	by	renting	it	out	to	unwitting	third	parties,	thereby	deriving	$500	in	profits.	As	I	have	noted,
she	is	unjustly	enriched	and	thereby	owes	Victim	at	least	$500.	But	suppose	Thief	invests	$500	in	a	stock	the	value
of	which	subsequently	increases.	Does	Thief	now	owe	Victim,	in	addition	to	the	$500,	the	increased	value	of	the
stock?	As	a	legal	matter,	in	most	Anglo-American	jurisdictions	the	answer	would	be	‘no’,	since	those	dividends	did
not	arise	‘directly’	from	the	wrongful	use	of	the	victim’s	car	(this	describes	the	so-called	‘direct	use’	standard).
Instead,	Thief	would	owe	only	the	$500	in	benefits	she	obtains	from	the	car’s	use.	Virgo	Graham	contends	that
such	a	limiting	principle	is	necessary	to	prevent	‘over-protection	of	the	claimant’. 	But	there	is	another	oft-noted
consideration	in	favour	of	the	‘direct	use’	standard:	as	the	‘dirty’	profits	derived	from	renting	the	car	are	alloyed
with	‘clean’	money	and	together	used	in	economic	activity	yielding	returns,	which	is	itself	used	in	further
investments,	it	becomes	hard	to	determine	in	a	principled	way	how	much	should	be	disgorged.	And	as	the
economic	benefits	ramify	through	the	economy	(including	the	benefits	derived	by	those	who	innocently	rented	the
car),	it	becomes	difficult	to	force	disgorgement	without	harming	third-party	innocents.
The	problem	with	the	direct	use	standard,	though,	is	that	it	is	unclear	what	counts	as	‘direct	use’.	Fortunately,	I
need	not	address	this	issue	here,	since	on	any	existing	interpretation	of	the	standard,	the	profits	derived	from
wrongfully	and	culpably	developing	and	selling	what	rightfully	belongs	to	others—such	as	the	resources	extracted
from	one’s	land—falls	within	the	scope	of	‘direct	use’.
5.	Failures	of	the	Duty	to	Redress
What	happens	if	the	unjust	beneficiary	fails	to	discharge	her	restitutionary	duty?	Suppose	she	is	in	a	position	to
recognize	that	she	has	such	a	duty,	and	she	is	able	to	discharge	this	duty	but	culpably	fails	to	recognize	the	moral
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importance	of	doing	so.
In	certain	cases,	a	culpable	failure	to	discharge	a	restitutionary	duty	can	make	an	individual	liable	to	harms
exceeding	the	amount	that	she	owes,	if	such	harms	are	necessary	to	force	restitution.	To	motivate	this	view,	return
to	Well	example.	Recall	that	Thief	badly	injures	Victim	in	the	course	of	wrongly	appropriating	Victim’s	well,	which
Thief	leases	to	Beneficiary,	who	knows	that	it	properly	belongs	to	Victim.	I	claimed	that,	under	the	user	principle,
Beneficiary	owes	Victim	the	unjustly	derived	proceeds	she	gains	by	her	wrongful	use	of	the	well.
Suppose,	though,	that	Beneficiary	refuses	to	discharge	her	duty	of	restitution;	she	refuses	to	hand	over	the
proceeds,	even	though	she	can	easily	do	so.	Suppose	further	that	the	only	way	to	force	her	to	disgorge	the
wrongfully	derived	benefits	is	by	imposing	a	cost	on	her	substantially	greater	than	the	value	of	those	benefits.
Specifically,	as	a	result	of	her	refusal	to	comply,	the	only	way	to	gain	access	to	the	wrongfully	derived	benefits
from	the	use	of	the	well	is	to	kill	Beneficiary.
It	seems	to	me	that,	under	these	circumstances,	she	is	morally	liable	to	be	killed	if	necessary	to	force	her	to
disgorge	the	wrongfully	derived	proceeds.	At	first,	this	might	seem	draconian;	Beneficiary	is	neither	the	one	who
forced	the	well	from	Victim,	nor	was	she	a	cause	of	Victim’s	injury.	More	generally,	a	fiscal	duty	of	redress	is
typically	not	so	strong	as	to	invite	lethal	liability	in	the	event	that	the	duty	is	culpably	ignored.	But	when	discharging
the	duty	is	necessary	to	save	a	life	endangered	by	the	very	act	enabling	the	beneficiary’s	unjust	enrichment,	it
seems	that	the	duty	to	redress	is	made	substantially	stronger.	The	victim	already	has	claim	to	what	the	beneficiary
unjustly	appropriated—the	issue	here	is	whether	the	victim’s	need	enhances	that	claim.	We	might	say	that,	in
general,	the	greater	the	legitimate	need	that	the	victim	has	for	what	the	beneficiary	unjustly	appropriated,	the
stronger	the	beneficiary’s	duty	to	transfer	the	benefits.	But	for	those	who	find	this	claim	too	expansive,	we	can
attenuate	it	by	adding	the	caveat	that	the	victim’s	legitimate	need	enhances	the	strength	of	the	duty	to	discharge
the	benefit	only	if	the	victim’s	need	is	a	result	of	wrongful	acts	enabling	the	beneficiary’s	unjust	enrichment.
If	this	is	right,	Beneficiary’s	duty	can	be	characterized	as	a	stringent	duty	to	engage	in	life-saving	restitution	to
Victim.	This	is	why	culpably	failing	to	discharge	the	duty	can	make	Beneficiary	liable	to	be	killed	if	necessary	to
force	her	to	do	what	she	culpably	chooses	not	to	do.	To	be	clear,	the	duty	to	save	Victim’s	life	is	not	a	duty	of
beneficence;	arguably,	a	duty	of	beneficence	to	save	another’s	life	is	typically	not	strong	enough	to	make
culpable	violators	liable	to	be	killed.	There	might	be	a	‘ceiling’	on	the	harms	to	which	one	is	liable	resulting	from
violations	of	the	duty	of	beneficence	owed	to	another	individual	in	need.	But	there	is	no	analogous	ceiling	for
restitutionary	duties.
The	duty	of	beneficence	is	usually	cast	as	an	agent-neutral	utilitarian	duty	to	make	things	go	better	or	best.	Critics
of	consequentialist	theories	of	normative	ethics	fear	that	an	unrestricted	version	of	this	duty	might	take	over	our
lives	by	requiring	us	to	forego	all	unnecessary	benefits	that,	when	transferred	to	others,	will	do	more	good
impersonally	measured.	In	order	to	limit	the	scope	of	this	duty,	some	have	argued	that	there	is	a	protected	sphere
of	conduct	in	which	we	are	permitted	to	act	in	ways	that	do	not	promote	what	is	impersonally	best.	Put	in	the	jargon
of	normative	theory,	we	have	an	agent-centred	prerogative	to	pursue	our	own	projects	even	if	doing	so	precludes
doing	what	makes	things	go	best.	Samuel	Scheffler	called	this	the	‘liberation	strategy’	for	limiting	the	demands	of
consequentialism. 	Now,	if	this	strategy	circumscribes	the	scope	of	impersonal	utilitarian	demands,	then	it	stands
to	reason	that	it	circumscribes	their	stringency	as	well—which	means	that	there	are	limits	to	the	harms	we	are	liable
to	suffer	for	violating	the	duties	of	beneficence	that	survive	the	liberation	strategy.	Tadros	argues	that	at	least
some	of	our	impersonal	utilitarian	duties	are	enforceable,	in	that	a	failure	to	abide	by	them	makes	it	permissible	for
others	to	force	us	to	act	accordingly.	That	is	to	say,	we	have	no	right	not	to	be	forced	to	comply	with	some	duties
of	beneficence,	which	means	we	are	liable	to	be	so	used. 	But	if	the	stringency	of	the	impersonal	utilitarian	duty	is
circumscribed,	then	the	degree	of	harm	to	which	we	are	liable	in	furtherance	of	enforcing	that	duty	is	limited	as
well.
But	the	liberation	strategy	cannot	similarly	circumscribe	the	stringency	of	restitutionary	duties.	This	is	because
incurring	such	duties	is	relevantly	within	our	control.	The	purpose	of	the	liberation	strategy	is	to	prevent	the	moral
demands	of	the	impersonal	standpoint	from	enjoining	us	to	do	what	would	make	things	go	best	overall.	But	there	is
already	a	mechanism	in	place	to	prevent	restitutionary	duties	from	similarly	‘taking	over’	our	lives:	we	can	simply
refrain	from	unjustly	enriching	ourselves.	(If	we	are	unable	to	do	so—if	it	is	prohibitively	difficult	to	rejected	or
disgorge	such	benefits—then	there	is	no	restitutionary	duty.)	So	there	is	no	basis	for	thinking	that	the	liberation
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strategy	imposes	a	ceiling	on	the	stringency	of	our	duties	of	redress,	whereas	there	is	a	reason	for	thinking	that	it
imposes	a	ceiling	on	the	stringency	of	our	duties	of	restitution.
Absent	a	principled	reason	for	imposing	a	ceiling	on	the	stringency	of	restitutionary	duties,	there	is	no	reason	to
think	that	a	culpable	failure	to	discharge	such	a	duty	cannot	ground	lethal	liability	in	certain	circumstances.	It	is
important	to	stress,	though,	that	the	claim	is	not	that	unjustly	enriched	person	are,	in	general,	morally	liable	to	be
killed	as	a	means	of	forcing	them	to	discharge	their	restitutionary	duties;	this	would	typically	violate	the	constraint
of	proportionality.	But,	in	the	case	at	hand,	killing	Beneficiary	as	a	necessary	means	of	forcing	her	to	discharge	her
duty	does	not	violate	the	constraint	of	proportionality	because	Victim	is	not	only	owed	the	funds,	but	also	needs
them	to	survive	because	of	the	harms	imposed	on	her	in	the	course	of	enabling	Beneficiary’s	unjust	enrichment.
What	I	have	claimed,	then,	is	this:	if	(1)	an	unjustly	enriched	individual	has	restitutionary	duties,	(2)	fulfilling	these
duties	will	save	the	life	of	the	individual	to	whom	it	is	owed,	(3)	discharging	the	duty	will	not	cost	the	unjust
beneficiary	significantly	more	than	what	refraining	from	discharging	the	duty	will	cost	the	individual	to	whom	it	is
owed,	(4)	the	beneficiary	culpably	refrains	from	discharging	her	duties	herself,	(5)	there	are	no	effective	judicial
institutions	to	defer	to	as	a	means	of	enforcing	the	claim	against	the	unjust	beneficiary,	and	(6)	there	is	no	way	to
force	the	unjust	beneficiary	to	discharge	her	restitutionary	duties	other	than	by	killing	her,	then	the	unjust
beneficiary	is	morally	liable	to	be	killed.
One	of	the	conditions	that	I’ve	claimed	must	be	satisfied	in	order	for	an	unjust	beneficiary	to	be	liable	to	be	killed	as
a	necessary	means	of	enforcing	a	life-saving	restitutionary	duty	is	that	the	beneficiary	must	be	culpable.	To	be
culpable	in	the	relevant	sense,	she	must	not	only	fail	to	discharge	her	restitutionary	duty,	but	she	must	also	be	in	a
position	to	recognize	that	(1)	there	is	a	significant	chance	that	she	has	appropriated	resources	rightfully	belonging
to	someone	else,	(2)	appropriating	resources	rightfully	belonging	to	someone	else	is	wrongful,	(3)	she	owes	the
wronged	persons	restitution	for	having	misappropriated	their	resources,	(4)	there	are	means	by	which	to	discharge
this	duty,	and	(5)	in	the	course	of	dispossessing	the	wronged	persons	of	their	resources,	they	were	harmed	in	such
a	way	as	to	put	them	in	dire	need	of	life-saving	assistance.
Of	course,	in	tort	law,	defendants	of	civil	suits	found	liable	to	substantial	monetary	restitution,	and	who	culpably
refuse	to	pay,	cannot	be	permissibly	killed	even	if	this	is	necessary	to	force	them	to	pay	what	they	owe.	But	this	is
because	it	has	probably	never	been	the	case	that	killing	a	defendant	is	necessary	to	save	the	plaintiff’s	life.	There
are	several	reasons	why	this	is	so.	In	a	well-functioning	civil	society,	there	will	almost	always	typically	be	other
means	by	which	the	plaintiff	can	obtain	life-saving	medical	treatment.	And,	second,	even	if	there	aren’t	such
alternative	means,	it	is	hard	to	envision	a	case	in	which	killing	the	unjustly	enriched	defendant	would	be	useful	in
saving	the	plaintiff’s	life.	It	is	no	surprise,	then,	that	civil	law	does	not	countenance	killing	as	a	means	of	enforcing
culpable	violations	of	civil	suits—the	circumstances	in	which	doing	so	would	be	morally	permissible	are	so	unlikely
to	obtain	that	permitting	lethal	enforcement	is	more	likely	to	be	abused	than	it	is	to	prevent	injustice.	But	we
shouldn’t	make	the	mistake	of	concluding	from	the	fact	that	there	is	no	lethal	enfacement	in	civil	law	that	there	is,	in
principle,	a	low	ceiling	on	the	harms	to	which	an	unjust	beneficiary	is	liable	to	suffer	when	she	culpably	refuses	to
discharge	life-saving	benefits	to	the	individual	harmed	in	the	course	of	enabling	the	beneficiary’s	unjust
enrichment.	Outside	a	well-functioning	civil	society,	as	in	the	cases	described	in	our	examples—and	in	the	context
of	war—circumstances	arise	in	which	killing	an	unjust	beneficiary	is	the	only	way	to	save	the	life	of	the	victim.
6.	The	Liability	of	War-Profiteers
If	what	I’ve	argued	is	correct,	resource-based	war-profiteers	can	owe	redress	to	those	civilians	whose	resources
were	misappropriated,	even	if	the	profiteer	did	not	contribute	to	the	act	that	dispossessed	the	civilians	of	their
resources.	That	is,	opportunistic	resource-based	war-profiteers	can	owe	redress	to	those	civilians	whose
resources	were	misappropriated.	If,	in	the	course	of	dispossessing	them	of	their	land	or	resources,	the	civilians’
lives	are	endangered	(by	way	of	injury,	starvation,	disease,	dehydration,	etc.),	and	if	discharging	the	restitutionary
duty	will	avert	that	loss	of	life,	then	the	restitutionary	duty	owed	to	them	is	especially	stringent.	This	is,	again,
because	the	stringency	of	a	restitutionary	duty	is	determined	in	part	by	the	severity	of	the	harms	that	discharging
that	duty	will	avert;	or,	more	conservatively,	it	is	determined	in	part	by	the	severity	of	the	harms	imposed	on	the
victims	in	the	course	of	enabling	the	beneficiary’s	unjust	enrichment.
One	way	for	a	resource-based	war-profiteer	to	avoid	such	duties	is	to	simply	cease	any	profitable	association	with
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the	corporations	or	groups	through	which	the	profiteer	derives	her	benefits.	To	the	extent	that	the	profiteer	has
already	wrongly	derived	such	benefits,	she	can	discharge	her	duty	of	redress	through	individual	financial
donations	to	charities	and	humanitarian	organizations	focussed	on	alleviating	the	suffering	of	the	victims	in	the
wronged	country.	If	no	such	charity	operates	in	the	relevant	region,	there	might	still	be	other	ways	to	discharge	a
duty	of	redress,	perhaps	by	contributing	the	unjustly	derived	profits	to	politically	oriented	efforts	aimed	at	stopping
the	war	(or	unjust	operations	in	the	war).
It	is	important	to	note	that	it	is	not	enough	for	the	profiteer	to	benefit	just	any	civilian	unjustly	victimized	by	their
government;	the	profiteers	have	duties	of	redress	to	those	civilians	specifically	who	were	harmed	in	the	course	of
wrongly	appropriating	their	resources—resources	by	which	the	profiteers	were	enriched.	Alleviating	the	suffering
of	other	civilians	in	the	country	(or,	for	that	matter,	the	famine-stricken	elsewhere	in	the	world)	does	nothing	to
satisfy	the	duty	of	redress	that	a	profiteer	owes	to	those	whose	suffering	enabled	the	profiteer’s	enrichment,	any
more	than	donating	to	Oxfam	would	satisfy	a	duty	of	redress	I	have	to	an	individual	whose	car	I	illicitly	used	as	part
of	a	rental	business.
If	there	is	nothing	a	resource-based	war-profiteer	(who	has	since	ceased	the	activity	by	which	was	unjustly
enriched)	can	do	to	discharge	her	duties	to	the	relevant	victimized	civilians,	the	profiteer	is	still	morally	required	to
disgorge	her	earnings.	This	is	because	there	are	two	injustices	associated	with	unjust	enrichment.	First	(in
accordance	with	the	cardinal	principle	that	wrongdoers	should	not	benefit	from	their	wrongdoing),	it	is	wrong	for
the	unjustly	enriched	party	to	keep	and	thereby	benefit	from	what	she	has	wrongly	derived.	Second	(in
accordance	with	the	user	principle),	the	victim	is	owed	at	least	part	of	what	the	unjustly	enriched	party	wrongly
derived	from	the	misappropriation	of	the	victim’s	resources.	So,	even	if	it	is	prohibitively	difficult	to	address	the
second	wrong,	the	profiteer	can	still	address	the	first	by	disgorging	her	wrongly	obtained	benefits.
Resource-based	war-profiteers	are	typically	culpable	for	their	wrongful	misappropriation	of	resources	and	their
failure	to	engage	in	restitution.	Any	worldly	adult	of	reasonable	intelligence	is	at	least	in	a	position	to	recognize
(even	if	she	fails	to	do	so)	that	resources	appropriated	from	a	zone	of	armed	conflict	are	unlikely	to	have	been
rightfully	appropriated.	If	the	territory	is	under	dispute,	then	any	putative	claim	of	ownership	by	those	in	control	of
the	territory	(including	the	government)	ought	to	be	treated	sceptically.	Consequently,	the	profiteer	is	in	a	position
to	recognize	that	there	is	a	significant	chance	that	she	is	not	entitled	to	the	benefits	of	selling	or	purchasing	those
resources.	If	it	is	at	all	clear	who	was	dispossessed	of	the	resources,	and	there	are	means	(such	as	charities)	by
which	to	transfer	some	of	those	benefits	to	the	rightful	party,	and	the	profiteer	fails	to	avail	herself	of	these	means,
then	she	is	a	culpable	opportunistic	resource-based	war-profiteer—that	is,	she	culpably	fails	to	discharge	her	life-
saving	restitutionary	duty.	Indeed,	even	if	it	is	not	at	all	clear	who	was	dispossessed	of	the	resources	that	the
profiteer	has	appropriated,	it	is	still	clear	that	they	do	not	belong	to	the	profiteer—a	failure	to	disgorge	the
resources	(or	its	converted	value)	is	itself	a	culpable	failure.
If	the	resource-based	war-profiteer	has	an	opportunity	to	fulfil	her	duties	of	redress	to	the	innocents	who	were
harmed	in	the	course	of	dispossessing	them	of	their	land	and	yet	fails	to	do	so,	then	the	profiteer	can	be	forced	to
discharge	her	life-saving	duty	by	killing	her,	if	that	is	the	least	harmful	means	by	which	to	save	those	lives.
At	first,	this	might	seem	implausible.	Culpably	failing	to	discharge	a	duty	of	redress	is	typically	not	worth	a	human
life.	And	even	if	killing	the	profiteer	will	save	the	lives	of	innocents	who	were	harmed	in	the	course	of	dispossessing
them	of	resources	that	enriched	the	profiteer,	it	seems	as	if	this	benefit	cannot	be	included	in	the	‘benefits	column’
of	the	proportionality	calculation	determining	the	degree	of	harm	to	which	the	profiteer	is	liable	because	she	is	not
responsible	for	the	harms	that	those	civilians	face.	After	all,	by	hypothesis,	the	opportunistic	resource-based	war-
profiteer	has	contributed	neither	to	the	harms	nor	to	the	actual	theft	of	the	resources.	So	it	seems	that	the	amount
of	harm	that	can	be	permissibly	imposed	upon	such	a	profiteer	to	force	her	to	discharge	her	restitutionary	duties	is
small.
But	this	is	an	illusion.	Suppose	the	resource-based	war-profiteer	can	discharge	her	restitutionary	duty	by	writing	a
cheque	to	the	relevant	aid	agencies;	doing	so	will	save	the	lives	of	some	of	the	innocents	who	were	harmed	in	the
course	of	dispossessing	them	of	the	resources	that	the	profiteer	has	since	sold	or	purchased.	If	the	resource-
based	war-profiteer	has	a	moral	obligation	to	write	that	cheque,	thereby	saving	those	lives,	then	the	consequences
of	a	failure	to	do	so	can	indeed	be	included	in	the	proportionality	calculation	determining	the	degree	of	harm	that
can	be	permissibly	imposed	on	the	profiteer.	This	is	because	the	profiteer	is	obligated	to	save	those	lives	by
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donating	the	funds.	She	is	so	obligated	because	the	benefits	she	has	garnered	were	unjustly	derived	from	the
victimization	of	those	innocents;	she	consequently	owes	them	restitution	that,	it	so	happens,	will	save	lives.	If	this
is	right,	the	profiteer	can	indeed	be	preventively	killed	if	doing	so	is	necessary	to	achieve	the	good	that	she	was
obligated	to	do	and	had	culpably	failed	to	do.	Of	course,	killing	the	profiteer	won’t	result	in	her	giving	to	charity.	But
if	killing	her	is	an	effective	means	to	saving	the	relevant	lives	of	civilians,	then	killing	the	profiteer	is	a	means	of
forcing	her	to	discharge	a	duty	she	culpably	failed	to	fulfil	on	her	own—a	duty	to	engage	in	life-saving	restitution.
This	is,	again,	consonant	with	Tadros’s	account	of	the	relation	between	duties	and	liability;	he	argues	that	a
person’s	failure	to	act	in	accordance	with	an	enforceable	duty	makes	her	liable	to	harms	necessary	to	force	her	to
do	what	she	was	obligated	to	do	or	to	avert	the	harm	that	she	was	obligated	to	avert.
It	might	be	pointed	out	that	once	civilians	have	been	killed	in	the	course	of	dispossessing	them	of	resource-rich
territory	used	to	enrich	war-profiteers,	there	is	nothing	such	a	profiteer	can	do	to	help	such	civilians;	they	are,
after	all,	already	dead.	The	profiteer	would	have,	at	best,	a	restitutionary	duty	to	the	families	of	the	victims.	But
since	this	is	not	a	life-saving	restitutionary	duty,	it	cannot	be	enforced	through	lethal	means.	However,	the	majority
of	civilian	deaths	due	to	warfare	come	from	postcombat	conditions,	rather	than	from	the	use	of	armaments.	Neta
Crawford	has	concluded	that	‘although	it	is	difficult	to	estimate	the	number	of	those	killed	indirectly	by	war	with
confidence,	it	is	safe	to	say	that	indirect	deaths	outnumber	direct	deaths’. 	And,	based	on	data	on	armed	conflicts
between	2004	and	2007,	the	Geneva	Declaration	Secretariat	suggests	that,	‘a	reasonable	average	estimate	would
be	a	ratio	of	four	indirect	deaths	to	one	direct	death	in	contemporary	conflicts’. 	Regardless	of	what	the	exact
figures	are,	it	is	clear	that	the	excess	morbidity	and	mortality	among	civilians	resulting	from	armed	conflicts	are
often,	if	not	usually,	the	indirect	rather	than	the	direct	result	of	combat.	This	means	that	even	after	civilians	have
been	dispossessed,	through	armed	conflict,	of	land	and	resources,	many	of	them	will	die	preventable	deaths	from
disease,	starvation,	injuries,	and	dehydration.	Insofar	as	these	deaths	are	caused	in	part	by	the	armed	conflict
dispossessing	the	civilians	of	their	land	and	resources,	and	if	aid	agencies	can	prevent	at	least	some	of	these
deaths,	then	the	resource-based	war-profiteers	unjustly	enriched	by	those	resources	have	a	restitutionary	duty	to
transfer	the	wrongly	derived	benefits	to	those	aid	agencies,	thereby	saving	the	lives	of	those	innocents.
Consequently,	the	restitutionary	duties	of	resource-based	war-profiteers	will	not	be	limited	to	redressing	the	families
of	those	wrongly	killed	in	the	course	of	the	armed	conflict	that	forcibly	dispossessed	the	victims	of	their	land	and
resources;	in	addition,	and	more	importantly,	their	restitutionary	duty	will	be	to	save	the	lives	of	those	who	will	die
from	the	effects	of	the	armed	conflict	that	forcibly	dispossessed	them	of	their	land	and	resources.
So	far,	I	have	argued	that	if	killing	an	opportunistic	resource-based	war-profiteer	who	has	culpably	failed	to
discharge	life-saving	restitutionary	duties	to	the	relevant	victims	is	the	only	available	way	of	saving	the	lives	of	any
number	of	those	victims,	then	the	opportunistic	resource-based	war-profiteer	is	morally	liable	to	be	killed	as	a	way
of	enforcing	her	restitutionary	duty.	But	in	what	circumstances	would	killing	an	opportunistic	resource-based	war-
profiteer	save	the	lives	the	innocents	who	were	harmed	in	the	course	of	armed	conflicts	that	dispossessed	them	of
their	land	and	resources?	Recall	that	an	opportunistic	resource-based	war-profiteer	contributes	neither	to	that
specific	military	operation	nor	to	the	war	in	general	(or,	more	carefully,	she	does	not	contribute	to	a	degree	greater
than	the	typical	civilian	does).	It	is	indeed	difficult	to	envision	how	targeting	opportunistic	resource-based	war-
profiteering	importers	would	help	save	the	lives	of	the	relevant	victims.	These	profiteers	will	typical	reside	in	foreign
countries—often	countries	that	are	not	party	to	the	conflict	in	question.	Targeting	nationals	of	a	foreign	country	on
their	own	soil	is	likely	to	antagonize	the	foreign	government,	possibly	expanding	the	conflict.	So,	although
opportunistic	resource-based	war-profiteering	importers	who	have	culpably	failed	to	discharge	their	life-saving
restitutionary	duties	would	be	liable	to	be	killed	if	killing	them	were	effective	in	saving	the	lives	of	the	relevant
innocents,	it	is	(fortunately	for	the	profiteers)	unlikely	that	this	condition	will	obtain	in	any	given	conflict.
But	the	situation	is	crucially	different	for	opportunistic	resource-based	war-profiteering	exporters.	These	profiteers
often	reside	or	do	business	in	the	very	country	where	civilians	were	or	are	in	the	process	of	being	forcibly
dispossessed	of	their	land	and	resources.	(Indeed,	as	the	various	instanced	outlined	earlier	illustrate,	these
profiteers	often	share	the	same	nationality	or	allegiance	as	the	group	that	victimized	the	civilians.)	This	means	that
targeting	opportunistic	resource-based	war-profiteering	exporters	is	not	pragmatically	problematic	in	the	same	way
that	targeting	opportunistic	resource-based	war-profiteering	importers	tends	to	be	because	it	typically	will	not
require	violating	the	sovereignty	of	a	third-party	country.	If	the	lives	of	opportunistic	resource-based	war-
profiteering	exporters	are	threatened,	this	might	very	well	coerce	them	into	pressuring	the	unjustly	warring	party	to
cease	or	at	least	diminish	the	scope	or	intensity	of	its	campaign.	This	is	not	an	unreasonable	presumption	given
41
42
43
Noncombatant Immunity and War-Profiteering
Page 14 of 18
PRINTED FROM OXFORD HANDBOOKS ONLINE (www.oxfordhandbooks.com). (c) Oxford University Press, 2015. All Rights
Reserved. Under the terms of the l icence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a title in Oxford
Handbooks Online for personal use (for details see Privacy Policy).
Subscriber: OUP-Reference Gratis Access; date: 19 October 2015
that	resource-based	war-profiteering	exporters	tend	to	be	among	the	social	and	economic	elite,	with	more	political
influence	than	the	average	civilian.	(Recall	from	Section	2	that	the	profiteers	in	question	are	those	who	are	in
leadership	positions	in	the	corporation	in	question.	What	counts	as	a	leadership	position,	of	course,	need	to	be
examined;	for	purposes	here,	I	leave	the	category	vague.)	Targeting	these	profiteers	in	a	context	where	it	is	made
clear	why	they	are	being	targeted	can	motivate	them	to	use	this	influence	to	yoke	the	military	conduct	of	the
unjustly	warring	party.	This,	in	turn,	is	likely	to	save	lives,	thereby	enforcing	the	restitutionary	life-saving	duty	of	the
resource-based	war-profiteering	exporter.
But	recall	that	the	resource-based	war-profiteer	has	a	life-saving	restitutionary	duty	not	towards	just	anyone,	or
even	just	towards	the	victims	of	the	war,	but	rather	towards	the	specific	civilians	whose	land	or	resources	were
wrested	from	them	and	who	as	a	result	are	in	need	of	life-saving	assistance.	The	resource-based	war-profiteer	is
not	liable	to	be	killed	to	save	just	anyone,	but	instead	to	save	them	specifically.	But,	generally,	the	longer	a	war
lasts,	the	greater	the	rate	of	morbidity	and	mortality	of	those	who	were	not	killed	during	the	war—which	will	likely
include	at	least	some	of	those	civilians	displaced,	injured,	diseased,	or	starving	as	a	result	of	the	military
operations	that	dispossessed	them	of	the	resources	from	which	the	resource-based	war-profiteers	are	unjustly
enriched.	So	if	killing	a	resource-based	war-profiteer	helps	bring	an	end	to	the	conflict,	then	that	killing	is	likely	to
enforce	the	restitutionary	life-saving	duty	of	the	resource-based	war-profiteering	exporter,	even	though	that	duty	is
towards	specific	civilians.
There	are	two	empirical	presumptions	that	I	am	making	here:	(1)	that	killing	the	opportunistic	resource-based	war-
profiteering	exporter	will	help	save	lives	and	(2)	that	it	will	help	save	the	lives	of	the	civilians	to	whom	the	profiteer
has	a	life-saving	restitutionary	duty.	It	is	hard	to	know	how	certain	we	must	be	of	these	empirical	facts	in	order	to
be	justified	in	thinking	that	a	profiteer	is	indeed	liable	to	be	killed.	But	this	is	a	problem	that	plagues	every	aspect	of
war	that	involves	killing;	indeed,	the	epistemic	challenges	are	even	more	pronounced	in	cases	where	we	must
decide	whether	collaterally	killing	innocent	civilians	is	justified	by	the	predicted	benefits	of	destroying	a	military
target.	And	despite	the	epistemic	challenges,	we	accept,	at	least	in	principle,	that	collateral	innocent	deaths	can	be
morally	permissible.	Likewise,	despite	the	epistemic	challenges,	I	think	we	should	accept,	at	least	in	principle,	that
opportunistic	resource-based	war-profiteers	are	sometimes	liable	to	be	killed	in	war.
The	upshot	is	that	there	have	been	and	will	be	circumstances	in	which	not	only	contributory	but	also	opportunistic
resource-based	war-profiteering	importers	will	be	morally	liable	to	be	killed	by	combatants	fighting	in	furtherance	of
a	just	cause,	even	if	the	profiteers	have	not	contributed	to	any	unjust	aims.	Of	course,	when	resource-based	war-
profiteers—such	as	the	controlling	interests	in	a	corporation	buying	or	selling	misappropriated	resources—are
unjustly	enriched,	the	benefits	derived	will	likely	‘trickle	down’	to	subordinates	as	well	as	to	other	groups	and
individuals	with	whom	the	profiteer	does	business.	This	might	seem	to	suggest	that	they,	too,	owe	restitutionary
duties.	But	as	I	noted	in	Section	4,	the	wronged	victims’	claim	to	the	unjust	benefits	diminishes	as	these	benefits	are
dispersed	throughout	the	economy.	There	are	three	reasons	for	this.	First	(which	I	noted	earlier),	as	these	benefits
becomes	increasingly	mixed	with	legitimate	economic	activity,	disgorging	the	former	will	also	thereby	unjustly
threaten	the	latter,	which	provides	a	prima	facie	reason	to	forgo	forced	restitution	in	those	cases.	Second,	like
ripples	in	a	pond,	the	benefits	from	a	profiteer’s	unjust	enrichment	tend	to	diminish	as	they	pass	from	one	individual
to	the	next.	So,	even	if	downstream	beneficiaries	owe	restitution,	the	amount	that	they	will	be	require	to	transfer	will
accordingly	shrink.	And	third,	downstream	beneficiaries	of	the	profiteer’s	unjust	enrichment	are	less	likely	to	be	in	a
position	to	identify	the	causal	history	of	these	benefits—specifically,	that	they	were	derived	from	an	unjust	armed
conflict	in	which	innocents	were	dispossessed	of	their	land	and	resources.	Consequently,	these	downstream
beneficiaries	will	not	bear	the	culpability	necessary	to	enforce	their	restitutionary	duties	through	violent	means.
7.	The	Law	of	War	and	the	Morality	of	War
As	mentioned	in	Section	1,	advocates	of	the	revisionist	view	deny	that	the	principle	of	noncombatant	immunity	is
correct,	at	least	at	the	level	of	morality.	Civilians	who	contribute	substantially	to	an	unjust	war,	who	are	in	a	position
to	recognize	that	they	are	making	such	a	contribution,	and	who	can	refrain	from	doing	so	at	no	great	cost	to
themselves	are	morally	liable	to	be	targeted	if	doing	so	is	necessary	to	save	any	number	of	morally	innocent	lives.
Contributory	war-profiteers	can,	then,	be	morally	liable	to	be	killed,	on	this	view.	Their	status	as	civilians	does	not
insulate	them	against	liability,	given	their	conduct.	I	have	pushed	this	argument	further	by	arguing	that	culpably
contributing	to	an	unjust	war	is	not	a	necessary	condition	for	liability	to	be	lethally	targeted.	An	unjust	beneficiary,
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by	culpably	failing	to	discharge	a	life-saving	restitutionary	duty,	can	be	liable	to	be	lethally	targeted	if	doing	so	is
necessary	to	save	the	lives	of	those	whose	victimization	enabled	the	beneficiary’s	wrongful	enrichment.	This	is
further	reason	to	think	that	the	principle	of	noncombatant	immunity	is	mistaken—at	least	at	the	level	of	morality.
But	this	does	not	mean	that	there	should	be	no	legal	prohibition	against	targeting	noncombatants.	The	fact	that	it
can	be,	in	principle,	morally	permissible	to	target	civilians	does	not	mean	that	such	conduct	should	be	made	legal.
Normally,	the	fact	that	a	type	of	conduct	is	morally	permissible	suggests	that	it	ought	to	be	legally	permissible	as
well.	But	this	is	not	always	the	case	(and	not	merely	due	to	the	existence	of	malum	prohibitum	laws	and	statutes).
Sometimes	legally	permitting	morally	permissible	behaviour	has	bad	consequences.	There	are	several	reasons	for
thinking	that	this	is	likely	to	be	true	if	we	legally	permit	targeting	certain	types	of	civilians,	such	as	opportunistic
resource-based	war-profiteers.
As	mentioned	earlier,	there	is	an	epistemic	challenge	in	determining,	on	any	given	occasion,	whether	the
candidate	resource-based	war-profiteer	is	morally	liable	to	be	killed.	The	epistemic	difficulty	of	making	a	reliable
determination	combined	with	the	natural	inclination	to	err	on	the	side	of	self-interest	by	killing	likely	means	that
legally	permitting	such	targeting	will	result	in	the	intentional	killing	of	many	civilians	who	should	not	be	intentionally
killed.	(Indeed,	for	similar	sorts	of	reasons,	it	seems	to	me	that	collaterally	killing	civilians	should	be	illegal	as	well,
despite	that	it	is	sometimes	morally	permissible.	But	such	a	law	would	be	tantamount	to	outlawing	warfare,	which	is
presumably	unenforceable.)
In	addition,	there	are	widespread	cross-cultural	social	mores	against	targeting	civilians.	Although	as	a	moral
doctrine	this	blanket	prohibition	is	too	crude	(precisely	because	there	are	some	civilians	who	are	indeed	morally
liable),	the	widespread	agreement	has	been	hard-won	and	has	almost	certainly	done	more	good	than	ill.	A	legal
permission	to	target	certain	civilians	might	have	a	corrosive	effect	on	this	valuable	social	more	by	weakening	it
beyond	what	would	be	morally	prescribed.	It	is	not	hard	to	imagine	events	unfolding	in	this	way:	a	legal	permission
to	target	resource-based	war-profiteers	results	not	only	in	such	profiteers	being	targeted,	but	their	subordinates	as
well,	and	eventually	anyone	who	is	or	is	perceived	to	benefit	from	a	war.	Such	an	outcome	would	be	morally
catastrophic;	it	is	better,	then,	to	be	risk-averse.	We	should	keep	intact	the	mores	against	intentionally	killing
civilians	by	legally	prohibiting	all	such	killings,	even	though,	in	principle,	certain	civilians	are	morally	liable	to	be
killed.	In	the	meantime,	resource-based	war-profiteers	can	count	themselves	fortunate	that	they	cannot	be	legally
targeted	even	though	they	are	morally	liable.
But,	of	course,	these	are	just	armchair	predictions.	It	might	turn	out	that	legally	permitting	combatants	to	target
resource-based	war-profiteers	will	prevent	bloodshed.	Wars	are	often	funded	on	profits	from	trading	in	resources
and	commodities	dispossessed	from	others.	An	‘open	season’	on	such	profiteers	might	cause	them	to	think	twice
before	buying	or	selling	such	resources,	thereby	starving	a	group	of	funds	otherwise	needed	to	wage	war.
Ultimately,	the	point	here	is	not	to	argue	for	or	against	weakening	the	legal	prohibition	on	intentionally	targeting
noncombatants,	but	rather	to	point	out	that	whether	the	principle	of	noncombatant	immunity	is	correct	at	the	level
of	morality	under-determines	whether	an	exceptionless	version	of	the	principle	should	be	enshrined	in	law.	That
question	cannot	be	settled	without	the	help	of	historians	and	social-psychologists.
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